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Abstract
We reexamine the profitability and social eﬃciency of horizontal mergers in a
Cournot oligopoly with decreasing average costs. Assuming the merger allows
for eﬃciency gains in production, we identify the conditions under which
the merger is, respectively, profitable and socially desirable. The economic
preditions of the model are contrasted with FTC guidelines, based on a simple
method that allows to forecast the economic consequances of a merger in
terms of ex ante observables. This comparative assessment highlights the
existence of well defined parameter regions where FTC guidelines lead to
systematic errors.
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1 Introduction
Antitrust regulation on horizontal mergers is based on the use of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI). This index is easy to use as it only needs informa-
tion on market shares. Moreover, it is very appealing because it relies on
the idea that concentrated markets are harmful for consumers. However,
this approach neglects potential eﬃciency gains resulting from adjustments
in fixed costs via the merger. If social desirability of the merger is to be eval-
uated considering both consumer surplus and overall industry profits, i.e.
by the conventional utilitarian social welfare function, then the HH index
can be misleading, as already observed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990, 2000).
Nonetheless, while the economic foundation of their critics is sound, they did
not provide an alternative tool for the Antitrust authority.
The aim of this paper is precisely to propose an alternative measure
for evaluating horizontal mergers. In particular, we consider a standard
social welfare argument and propose a tool that can be managed also by
non-practitioners, as it is expressed only by observable variables such as the
number of firms, production’s outcome and costs.
We start from a situation where a synergy operates, in such a way that
the overall fixed cost associated with the merger is a fraction of the sum of the
fixed costs borne ex ante by the firms taking part into the merger. We com-
pare ex ante and ex post social welfare in such a way that only measurable
variables appear and discover when the proposed merger is socially and pri-
vately desirable. We point out the minimal requirement in terms of eﬃciency
gains required to allow the proposed merger to take place. More precisely,
we find the following results: first, if the fixed cost savings generated by the
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merger are large enough, then the merger becomes profitable irrespective of
the number of firms involved. Likewise, there exists a critical threshold of
such eﬃciency gain above which the merger is socially desirable. The ranking
of the two thresholds depend on the number of firms in the industry before
the merger takes place. If the size of the merger (that is, the number of firms
involved in it) is small enough, then we observe the counterintuitive and, thus
far, neglected situation where the merger is socially convenient while being
not profitable. If this is the case, then the policy maker may induce firms
to merge by subsidising them (for instance, by using funds raised through
taxes) provided that the representative shareholder is suﬃciently atomistic
to ensure that future dividends compensate current taxation.
After exposing the theoretical framework, we proceed to compare its nor-
mative implications against the current merger guidelines adopted by the
Federal Trade Commission. These are based on the Herfindal-Hirschman in-
dex, which of course is an indirect indicator, rather than the demand and cost
parameters belonging to the economic model. Therefore, in order to carry
out the comparative assessment, we design a simple method based upon ex
ante observable magnitudes only. This allows us to identify the occurrence
of errors in both directions, i.e., to allow a merger that should be forbidden
and conversely, produced by the application of FTC guidelines. Moreover,
we also identify qualitative conditions under which a merger to monopoly is
both privately and socially convenient. As a last step, we provide some exten-
sions of our method to diﬀerent setups, allowing for (i) asymmetric marginal
costs across firms, (ii) increasing marginal costs, and (iii) non-linear market
demand.
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The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. The model is outlined
in section 2. The assessment of the eﬀectiveness of FTC guidelines in the
light of the theoretical predictions is carried out in section 3. Extensions are
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We examine a Cournot oligopoly where, ex ante, n firms sell a homogeneous
good whose demand function is p = a−
Pn
i=1 qi. Each firm uses a technology
characterised by increasing returns to scale, summarised by the cost function
Ci = cqi + F, where c > 0 is the marginal cost and F > 0 is a fixed cost.
We first consider a market where n firms compete simultaneously. There-
fore, individual outputs and profits at the symmetric Nash equilibrium are:
qea =
a− c
n+ 1
; (1)
πea =
(a− c)2
(n+ 1)2
− F (2)
where the subscript ea indicates ex ante values. The corresponding consumer
surplus is:
CSea =
n2 (a− c)2
2 (n+ 1)2
. (3)
Hence, social welfare is SWea = nπea+CSea. For future reference, we express
the previous expressions as a function of individual quantities:
πea = q2ea − F (4)
CSea =
n2
2
q2ea (5)
SWea = n
³
1 +
n
2
´
q2ea − F (6)
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Before examining the feasibility of any horizontal merger, it must be
true that the n independent firms do survive at the initial Cournot Nash
equilibrium. This requires F < Fea , q2ea.
Now consider the situation where m ∈ [2, n− 1] firms evaluate the per-
spective of merging horizontally. We suppose that the merger gives rise to a
reorganization of production plants within the resulting firm; in particular,
we assume that the amount of fixed cost be equal to bF , (1 + b)F, where
b ∈ [0,m− 1] is an inverse measure of the eﬃciency gains generated by the
merger.1 Therefore, for all b < m− 1, the usual argument whereby a merger
is justified on eﬃciency grounds applies in the form of a reduction of the
total amount of fixed cost borne by society.
When the merger is carried out, n−m + 1 firms remain on the market;
outputs, profits and consumer surplus modify as follows:
qep =
a− c
n−m+ 2 ; (7)
bπep = (a− c)2
(n−m+ 2)2
− (1 + b)F (8)
π˜ep =
(a− c)2
(n−m+ 2)2
− F (9)
CSep =
(n−m+ 1)2 (a− c)2
2 (n−m+ 2)2
(10)
where bπep is the profit of the firm resulting from the merger while π˜ep is the
profit accruing to each of the n−m firms that have remained independent.
The associated social welfare is
SWep = bπep + (n−m) π˜ep + CSep. (11)
1If b = m− 1, then we are back to the case considered by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
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In order to assess the private and social desirability of any given merger,
one should compare ex post and ex ante levels of (insider) profits and social
welfare. However, what usually prevents antitrust agencies from using the
predictions of the theoretical model in such a straightforward way is the fact
that market size a− c is not known (or its measurement would take too long
and far too much money). Accordingly, guidelines usually prescribe simple
rules defined in terms of market shares and concentration indices. Yet, if
one dwells upon the fact that ex ante output levels are indeed available from
data bases, this obstacle may well become immaterial. To see this, note that
the ex ante and ex post magnitudes of profits and social welfare can be easily
redefined in terms of ex ante output levels only. In line with what is implicitly
assumed when using concentration indices, similarly we assume that both the
reservation price and the marginal cost of production are not altered when
the merger takes place. This assumption appears as a reasonable one, since
the merger has no impact on market size. Provided (a−c) remains constant,
from (1) we have:
a− c = (n+ 1)qea (12)
We can therefore write all ex post expressions as a function of the ex ante
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quantity as follows:
qep =
n+ 1
n−m+ 2qea;
bπep = (n+ 1)2
(n−m+ 2)2
q2ea − (1 + b)F ;
π˜ep =
(n+ 1)2
(n−m+ 2)2
q2ea − F ;
CSep =
(n−m+ 1)2 (n+ 1)2
2 (n−m+ 2)2
q2ea;
SWep =
(n+ 1)2 [(m− n− 3)(m− n− 1)]
2 (n−m+ 2)2
q2ea − (n−m+ b+ 1)F.
The advantage of this notation is that all ex post outcomes are easily
ascertained by simply considering ex ante variables, such as individual quan-
tities, total number of firms, potential candidates to the merger, fixed cost
of production and the eﬃciency gain (which is assumed to be perfectly ob-
servable).
Given that any merger modifies market structure but also the distribution
of fixed costs across firms in the industry, before proceeding to evaluate the
private and social desirability of a merger we must ensure that firms are
indeed viable at the corresponding ex post equilibrium. This requires the
condition bπep > 0⇔ F < Fep , (n+ 1)2 q2ea/ £(n−m+ 2)2 (1 + b)¤ .2
On the basis of the previous analysis, we can evaluate the social and
private desirability of the merger by comparing ex post and ex ante welfare
and profits. This allows to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all admissible levels of {b, n,m} , there exist the thresh-
2Note that this suﬃces to ensures that also π˜ep > 0, i.e., the outsiders’ ex post profits
be positive.
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old values of fixed costs Fπ and FSW above which the merger involving m
firms is, respectively, privately and socially desirable. If n = 3 and m = 2,
then Fπ < FSW . If instead n ≥ 4, then (i) Fπ > FSW if m is suﬃciently
small, and (ii) Fπ < FSW if m is suﬃciently large.
Proof. The private (profit) incentive to carry out the merger requires:
bπep
m
> πea ⇔ (13)
F > Fπ ,
[m(n−m+ 2)2 − (n+ 1)2]
(m− b− 1)(n−m+ 2)2 q
2
ea
while the social incentive requires:
SWep > SWea ⇔ (14)
F > FSW ,
(m− 1)(2n−m+ 3)
2 (m− 1− b) (n−m+ 2)2 q
2
ea.
Comparing Fπ and FSW , we obtain Fπ = FSW at
m1 =
5
4
+ n− 1
4
√
24n+ 33;m2 =
5
4
+ n+
1
4
√
24n+ 33. (15)
Clearly, m2 > n and can be disregarded; m1 is always smaller than n, but
m1 ≥ 2 if and only if n ≥ 4. If n = 3, we have a special case wherem1 = 1.688.
Therefore, we have two cases:
(i) for n = 3 and m = 2
Fπ =
(n+ 1)2
72 (1− b)q
2
ea < FSW =
7 (n+ 1)2
288 (1− b)q
2
ea; (16)
(ii) for all n ≥ 4,
Fπ > FSW for all m ∈ [2,m1) ;
Fπ < FSW for all m ∈ (m1, n− 1] .
(17)
7
This concludes the proof.
Now take the special case where n = 3 and m = 2. Here, given that the a
priori degree of concentration of the industry is very high, the critical thresh-
old for F above which the antitrust agency permits the merger is necessarily
higher than that above which firms find it profitable.
The perspective changes significantly for all n ≥ 4. Provided that, as n
increases, the market becomes progressively more competitive, then m1 be-
comes relevant and determines the presence of an interval where relatively
small mergers are socially desirable. Note that m1 is monotonically increas-
ing in n. To this regard, it is worth stressing that, for all F ∈ (FSW , Fπ) ,
any merger involving m ∈ [2,m1) is socially convenient while it is not pri-
vately so. That is, we have the seemingly counterintuitive result whereby
the antitrust agency would like the m firms to merge, whereas they prefer
to remain independent. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has
been overlooked so far in the existing literature. The reason of this result is
that m is small. This entails two related consequences: the first is that, for
any given b, the reduction in fixed costs enjoyed by the firms involved in the
merger is limited; the second is that the reduction in the overall number of
firms in the industry after the merger has taken place is also limited. The
first fact makes the merger unattractive to firms, while the second makes it
appealing for the regulator. When this is the case, the policy maker may
design an income transfer from consumers to the merging firms by means of
a lump sum tax that becomes a subsidy to firms, so as to make the merger
attractive to them. The total subsidy amounts toµ
πea −
bπep
m
+ ε
¶
m (18)
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where ε is positive and arbitrarily small. This of course has no redistributive
eﬀects provided that all agents holds symmetric shares of the stock of those
firms that are to carry out the merger.
3 The economic model vs FTC guidelines
Consider the 1992 FTCHorizontal Mergers Guidelines for evaluating prospect
mergers. The general standards are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex (”HHI”) of market concentration, which is calculated by summing the
squares of the individual market shares (in percentage terms) of all the par-
ticipants as follows:
a) Post-Merger HHI Below 1000 [...] Mergers resulting in un-
concentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive
eﬀects and ordinarily require no further analysis.
b) Post-Merger HHI Between 1000 and 1800 [...] Mergers
producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points in mod-
erately concentrated markets post-merger are unlikely to have
adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no fur-
ther analysis. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more
than 100 points in moderately concentrated markets post-merger
potentially raise significant competitive concerns [...].
c) Post-Merger HHI Above 1800. [...] Mergers producing an
increase in the HHI of less than 50 points, even in highly concen-
trated markets post-merger, are unlikely to have adverse com-
petitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis.
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Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 50 points
in highly concentrated markets post-merger potentially raise sig-
nificant competitive concerns [...] Where the post-merger HHI
exceeds 1800, it will be presumed that mergers producing an in-
crease in the HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. [...]
(1992 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES)
In view of the above FTC rules, we proceed now to evaluate the indica-
tions emerged from our model in order to obtain simple rules apt to evaluate
the admissibility of horizontal mergers, in such a way that they can be easily
compared with the FTC guidelines.
First of all, we focus on the space {n,m} . In Figure 1, the private and
social eﬃciency of horizontal mergers (given by conditions (13-14)) are rep-
resented by the two curves, and we consider the case in which the subspace
where SWep − SWea , ∆SW ≥ 0 is a proper subset of the subspace wherebπep/m − πea , ∆π > 0 for any triple (b, F, qea) . Provided that a merger
proposal is submitted by firms to the antitrust authority, we can take for
granted that ∆π > 0 holds. Accordingly, we confine our attention to the
region ∆SW ≥ 0,3 to observe that the border of this region, i.e., the curve
∆SW = 0, may (i) lie always below and the right of the line m = n; (ii)
be tangent to m = n; or (iii) intersect m = n twice. The locus ∆SW = 0
shifts leftwards when either F grows larger or b decreases (intuitively, in both
cases the eﬃciency gain produced by the merger is larger and therefore more
3This amounts to assuming that F ∈ [FSW ,min {Fea, Fep}) .
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easily justifies the merger itself). The interesting implication of this fact is
that whenever m = n and ∆SW = 0 intersect (Figure 2) or are tangent to
each other (Figure 3), then a merger to monopoly would be socially desirable
in that it allows so high an eﬃciency gain that natural monopoly is the most
desirable industry structure.
Figure 1
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
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Now we turn to the comparative assessment of the results emerging from
our analysis and the FTC guidelines, using a similar approach. Figure 4 plots
the FTC rules against the locus ∆SW = 0, for values of (b, F, qea) such that
∆SW = 0 never intersect m = n. Note that the condition ∆HHI < 100
corresponds to the triangle indicated by the arrow, while the area where
∆HHI < 50 is never relevant as it lies further to the right and always below
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the line HHI = 1800.
Figure 4
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Now, the prescription produced by our model is that the antitrust agency
should permit the merger in the convex area inside the locus ∆SW = 0. Yet,
the FTC merger guidelines allow for the merger to take place in the area
below and to the right of the envelope of ∆HHI = 100 and HHI = 1000.
Clearly, the two rules have a region in common, where the economic model
suggests that the merger is socially convenient and indeed the FTC guidelines
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point in the same direction. Similarly, there’s a region where the model
suggests not to carry out the merger and indeed the FTC guidelines do not
allow it. However, there are subsets of the parameter space where FTC rules
are in conflict with the prescriptions of the economic model and produce
mistakes of both types. For instance, if we take the region above the envelope
of ∆HHI = 100 and HHI = 1000, and inside the locus ∆SW = 0, we
observe that here the merger is socially convenient but it is not allowed
according to the FTC guidelines. Exactly the opposite happens in the region
below the envelope of ∆HHI = 100 and HHI = 1000, and outside the locus
∆SW = 0. Here the merger is socially harmful and yet it is allowed if FTC
guidelines are abide by strictly.
4 Extensions
Here we briefly discuss some possible extensions of the method proposed
above, in three directions:
• The first deals with the case of a linear demand and linear variable
costs - as in the previous case - with firms diﬀering as to their respective
marginal costs, so that the total cost function of firm i is Ci = ciqi+F.
This is a trivial extension of the basic case, where ex ante equilibrium
outputs are defined in terms of all firms’ marginal costs but essentially
the ex post performance of the merger can be easily assessed in therms
of ex ante production.
• The second perspective entails the combination of a linear market de-
mand with a cost function of the type Ci = cq2i + F. In such a case, ex
15
ante equilibrium outputs and price are
qea =
a
2c+ n+ 1
; pea = a− nqea. (19)
Therefore, solving the above system one obtains
a = pea − nqea ; c =
pea − qea
2qea
(20)
which can be used to write all ex post relevant expressions in terms of
ex ante observable variables.
• The third possible extension consists in an oligopoly market where
demand is hyperbolic and marginal cost is increasing:
p =
a
Q
;Ci = cq2i + F. (21)
In such a case, the ex ante equilibrium is given by
qea =
1
n
r
a (n− 1)
2c
; pea = a
s
2c
a (n− 1) (22)
which entail
a = npeaqea ; c =
pea (n− 1)
2nqea
. (23)
5 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly,
under the assumption that a merger entails some eﬃciency gain in the form
of a reduction in the overall fixed costs borne by the insider firms, i.e., those
taking part into the merger itself. We have identified the threshold levels of
fixed costs above which the merger is (i) privately and (ii) socially beneficial,
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and we also have outlined an elementary procedure to correctly forecast the
firms’ performance as well as the associated welfare level after the merger has
taken place. This method can be easily used by an antitrust agency to assess
the admissibility of any merger on purely economic grounds, without referring
to indirect indicators such as concentration indices. To this regard, we have
shown that the use of the Herfindal-Hirschman index, as currently prescribed
by FTC guidelines, is indeed bound to produce systematic mistakes in some
relevant regions of the parameter space. As a last step, we have also provided
some suggestions as to the general applicability of our method.
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